Journalistic verification against lies in the electoral processes of Ecuador and Spain[1]

La verificación periodística frente a la mentira en los procesos electorales de Ecuador y España

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Abstract

Fact-checking is key in the framework of electoral processes, political discourse has never been so exposed as it is today to public scrutiny and the possibility of being denied live and in a massive way. This research focuses on the fact-checking projects in Ecuador and Spain, and their role in the elections of both countries in March and April 2019, respectively.

The most relevant publications from both projects on Twitter were analyzed, the aim was to identify the main rumors that were spread and subject to verification, as well as the politicians about whom the most rumors were spread.

The most relevant results it is evident that the immigration issue and false declarations by candidates were the main topics of the fake news in both countries, and that the lies about certain candidates did not decisively affect the results of the elections. Similarly, it was evident that there is a marked inequality in the dissemination of verified information in both countries, since these do not reflect the same intensity in terms of the production of denials, as well as the dissemination of these.

Keywords

Journalism, information, internet, communication, social media, political campaign.

Resumen

La verificación de hechos es clave en el marco de procesos electorales, el discurso político nunca estuvo tan expuesto como hoy al escrutinio público y a la posibilidad de ser desmentido en vivo y de forma masiva. Esta investigación se enfoca en los proyectos de verificación informativa de Ecuador y España, y en su rol en las elecciones de ambos países en marzo y abril de 2019, respectivamente.

Se analizaron las publicaciones más relevantes de ambos proyectos en Twitter con el objetivo de identificar los principales rumores difundidos y sometidos a verificación, así como los políticos sobre los cuáles se difundió la mayor cantidad de rumores.

Los resultados más relevantes muestran que las declaraciones falsas de candidatos y la migración fueron los temas principales de las *fake news* en ambos países, y que las mentiras en torno a determinados candidatos no afectó de modo determinante los resultados de las elecciones. Del mismo modo se evidenció que existe una marcada desigualdad en la difusión de la información verificada en ambos países, puesto que estas no reflejan la misma intensidad en cuanto a la producción de desmentidos, así como a la difusión de estos.

Palabras clave

Periodismo, información, internet, comunicación, medios sociales, campaña política.

Introduction

Rumors and lies are common during elections. The use of these stratagems helps to blur the image of a candidate in front of his voters and is accompanied by questionable practices that hide behind the quest for victory,

thereby causing not only the discredit of others but also an increase in misinformation. In this context, verification of facts and political discourse has become more prominent in recent years (Nyhan et al., 2019) and has alerted not only politicians and their campaign teams but also journalists and the media against the reproduction of statements without verification.

ICTs have undoubtedly disrupted the way of political campaigning, transferring to the digital scene the different strategies to promote a candidate and his political project. However, the accelerated expansion of fake news opens a new front of action in electoral processes, in which, in addition to devising a way to lead a candidate to victory, it is necessary to confront the rumors and lies that are generated around their figure and project. Added to this is a set of new habits in the use and consumption of information in the midst of a time in which more than 50% of the world's population has access to the Internet and 49% is an active user of social networks (We are Social & Hootsuite, 2020), key spaces for the dissemination of disinformation.

With attention pointing towards social networks, it is necessary to consider some phenomena that occur, due to the nature they have and the possibilities they offer. One of them is technological prosumism (Toffler, 1979), activities that were previously mediated by third parties, and today are carried out by the user without censorship or control of any kind. This change in the digital ecosystem has fostered a multiplicity of information sources and data that circulate on the Internet, which are subject to the motivations and particular objectives of the users who create and disseminate them, which can range from the need to inform something of interest, going through the desire to make a joke, to intentionally distorting a reality. This has been the context that has made possible the dissemination of fake news, that information manipulated for specific purposes, generally political, with the aim of changing an image about something or someone, and that are presented in such a way that they impact and provoke an idea of reality through digital platforms, from which users contribute to its dissemination (Tandoc et al., 2018). It is not the same as errors in the information due to lack of expertise in investigating a fact, but rather they contain an intentionality and imitate the contents of the mass media (Tandoc et al., 2018), their format and style, but they lack editorial standards, sources and research.

The negative effects caused by the dissemination of fake news has shed a light on different initiatives for their control and eradication, some have to do with the creation of laws and sanctions intended to prohibit and punish

those who spread or produce false information; in several countries in Europe, laws have already been put in place against fake news, which are not exempt from criticism and the imminent danger of censorship as the power to decide what is a lie and what is not on the Internet is in the hands of governments (Valarezo-Cambizaca & Rodríguez-Hidalgo, 2019).

Other initiatives are born from journalism, as the profession that by nature develops processes of investigation, contrast, and verification of the facts and that currently is one of the keys in the fight against the misinformation phenomenon. But there is also a third alternative, whose vision is in the long term, it is media education or media literacy, through which citizens develop critical and reflective thinking in the use and consumption of media and information (Romero -Rodríguez & Rodríguez-Hidalgo, 2019).

This research is part of the second alternative: fact-checking, as part of the interpretive power that journalism has in political action processes (Luengo & García-Marín, 2020) and as a necessary element that allows the citizen to make decisions based on quality information.

To support this, previous research on fact-checking and electoral processes was reviewed, which have exposed the increase in informational verification practices led especially by journalists, and suggest that these can reduce erroneous perceptions in political discourse, although this is not reflected in the evaluation of candidates and electoral results (Nyhan et al., 2019). Others like Hill (2017) argue that political facts, true or false, generate prejudice in voters only if they identify with their pre-existing beliefs, and add a large amount of detail to resemble the product of an investigation (Chan et al., 2017), while for Guess et al. (2020) the levels of affectation by rumors and lies are directly related to the media that users permanently consume on the Internet.

Despite the fact that rumors, attacks, and smear campaigns have never been alien to the electoral processes, the global effect that the Internet gives to the information, enhances the harmful effect of misinformation regarding the way citizens view the world, they conceive what is real, correct and desirable; considering that it is from the information that people make decisions, such as who will be the authorities that manage the destinies of their communities.

It is no less true that informational verification processes generate some resistance among campaign teams, hence those who trust less in verifiers are more vulnerable to being influenced by misinformation (Lyons et al., 2020). Added to this is the need for access to open data that allow journalists to compare statements, figures, and information of various kinds, with reliable

data sources. Even today countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and others, work in the verification processes with the use of artificial intelligence systems that streamline this search and contrast of data.

The final debate between the candidates who aspired to the presidency of the United States in 2020 was the ideal space to demonstrate the increase in the spread of lies on social networks, which had as its main component the very discourse of the presidential candidates. Hundreds of journalists from international media such as The New York Times, the BBC in London, CNN, and specialized fact-checking organizations such as Politifact, Maldita.es, and others were protagonists on the night of October 22 when they denied the assertions of the candidates during their speeches.

This article collects the electoral experiences of Ecuador and Spain through informational verification in the elections held during 2019 in each country in order to demonstrate the relevance of informational verification as a line of journalism that counteracts the negative effects of misinformation.

The document presents, in the first instance, a systematic review of the literature, with the purpose of conceptualizing fake news and fact-checking as key elements of the investigation while indicating the current status of the issue of informational verification in the political-electoral context; subsequently, the methodology, objectives and research questions, study sample and instruments used are explained; then the analysis of the results is carried out, followed by the discussion and conclusions, where the most significant contributions of the research are observed.

State of the art

Elections and misinformation

Traditionally, electoral processes have been the fertile ground for the dissemination of fake news because social networks are crucial tools in the development of political campaigns due to the possibilities of closeness that it builds for the user (Rodríguez-Hidalgo & Silva, 2018). The discrediting of candidates, political projects, statements are common in every electoral process (Rincón, 2011), and it has been mainly the political opposition that has been in charge of disproving a political candidate, and to this is added journalism with fact-checking.

The dissemination of fake news causes adverse effects on society and weakens democracy, and it is not for nothing that Unesco alerted about false information and called for the development of critical thinking (Frau-Meigs, 2017) against which constitutes a technological and geopolitical danger of relevance, whose effects have already been reflected in recent electoral events such as Brexit, the European Union referendum, and the United States elections (Elías, 2018). Both events, which occurred in 2016, contributed to the institutionalization of what is known as the 'era of post-truth', and where the search for particular interests was evidenced through questionable strategies of mass convincing that promote the weakening of democracy (Ayres-Pinto & Moraes, 2020).

In addition to this, it is in the second of these contexts where the term fake news takes shape when Donald Trump, recently elected as president of the United States, used the combination of fake news to discredit the press, and later the political opposition and all those who questioned his administration (Baum-Baicker, 2020). This is due to a political strategy that seeks to obscure all negative information and modify the perceptions of citizens, a process in which the use of the media and information is essential in the way to legitimize a political leader (Lischka, 2019).

Lies are a regular part of the political game, but according to Cotrino-Zárate (2019), the key to manipulating public opinion lies in who says them, although factors such as the way they say it, the media that uses and the effects it causes on recipients, are relevant.

In the case of Spain, the government has its attention focused on the dissemination of fake news, but also academia and some organizations such as the European Commission, which on many occasions have expressed concern about the high exposure to misinformation, along with the need for control measures and awareness in people (European Commission, 2019).

During the referendum for the independence of Catalonia, in a number of social networks circulated photographs taken out of context on violence, corruption, and others (Serrat, 2019). One of the most popular was that of a group of police attacking citizens, and although hours later it was found that it was a photo of a demonstration from 2013, the clarification was not as popular as the rumor.

The same happens in Ecuador, where daily photographs with alleged statements by President Lenín Moreno are disseminated, which are later refuted. But as in Spain, and in other contexts, rebuttals do not go viral, ru-

mors do, this is due to the large emotional component that fake news have, added to narrative constructions: memes, photos, and videos altered, invented, or taken out of context.

The high emotional component in fake news is strengthened by the scarce exposure to quality information by users, and by the clearly emotional activity of users on social networks, not for nothing has Facebook placed as the main form of interaction with user publications a set of six emotions with their respective emojis: I like it, it saddens me, it amazes me, it amuses me, I love it and it makes me angry (Valarezo-Cambizaca & Rodríguez-Hidalgo, 2019).

Hence, whenever fake news are taken as true, it is because behind them there is an ideology that wants to confirm it. To this are added campaigns orchestrated with the help of trolls and bots to strengthen strategies aimed at misinformation, echoing messages that are required to reach the entire population.

Journalism in the face of fake news

Social networks have notably captured the attention of Internet users. Within them, they carry out socialization and entertainment activities (Rivera-Rogel et al., 2018), but also information. Given this, it should be noted that social networks are not information networks, they are networks for exchange, socialization, emotion, and of course for the dissemination of content, but they do not guarantee the veracity of the content that is disseminated through them. For this reason, social networks cannot be demanded the same responsibility that journalists and the media are required with regard to information management (Rodríguez-Hidalgo et al., 2020).

Despite this, the multinationals Facebook, Google, and WhatsApp have taken action to curb the spread of false information, which has been mainly motivated by the excess of rumors on social networks during the emergency caused by Covid-19, and that came to be qualified with the term 'infodemic' (World Health Organization, 2020). Given this, journalism has a fundamental role that is to provide answers and guide public opinion with quality information, and seek and guarantee the truth as the maximum value (Craft & Davis, 2013).

It is for this reason that in the last three years a series of organizations dedicated to the verification of the facts that are disseminated as truths on

the Internet have emerged (Álvarez & López, 2016), all of them led by journalists. La Silla Vacía in Colombia, Ojo Público in Peru, Ecuador Chequea in Ecuador, Chequeado.com in Argentina, Maldito Bulo in Spain; Fact-Check.org and Politifact.com in the United States and others are some of the organizations dedicated to fact-checking on the continent.

During 2020 the global health emergency prompted the creation of the Coronavirus Fact-Checking Alliance, a project of the Poynter Institute and the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), and in which there are subscribed around eighty organizations from more than forty countries in the world, to refute the rumors and lies that were spread on the Internet about the pandemic.

Countering rumors and lies not only enables better knowledge of the context, but also gives the citizen the possibility of making better-informed decisions, considering that the media constitute the windows through which people know the world and access information on topics, contexts, and facts that they do not experience directly (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). For this purpose, the quality of the information is key, and verification constitutes one of the indisputable competencies of journalists, which allows that information not to become the echo of what the sources indicate; and, in an electoral context, the candidates who aspire to a popular election dignity.

For Álvarez and López (2016), lying is part of the political game, which is why the results of the surveys are oversized, for example, hence the verification of data, speeches, and facts also has an educational dimension for the voter, but also for the political class that always requires figures, and for journalism that uses these figures as part of the information it publishes. Audiences go to the media in search of clarifying their doubts and obtaining information that allows them to elucidate the best voting option, therefore the practice of fact-checking as a discipline of journalism would notably change the rules of the electoral context, fostering a greater responsibility of the candidates when making statements in front of the public opinion.

This research focuses on the verification activities that Maldito Bulo carried out in Spain and Ecuador Chequea in Ecuador, in the March and April 2019 elections, with the purpose of identifying the main clarification efforts of both projects and highlighting the work of verification as that transcendental activity of journalism that guarantees the quality of the information that circulates in an electoral context.

Materials and methods

The study of the metrics of the Twitter accounts of the two organizations dedicated to verifying the information in each country Ecuador Chequea in Ecuador and Maldito Bulo in Spain was carried out, with the aim of studying the rumors that most frequently are denied and the topics and characters that are predominantly subject to verification.

The study of metrics makes it possible to understand how they produce social transformations thanks to the influence of social networks, which are in charge of configuring some sociological trends and patterns with emotion as their main component (Magallón, 2019).

The research questions that guide this research are: What types of rumors are most often disproved? Who are the characters and themes present in the refuted content? What is the methodology applied by fact-checking projects in Ecuador and Spain?

To answer these questions, a quantitative research is proposed. This form of study allows the application of methodological instruments that can be used both on content and on a container (Bardin, 2002) while being a type of replicable procedure that allows inferring the results, as well as making a quantitative description of reality, in this case to through descriptive statistics (Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 2004).

In this context, a total of 135 tweets from Ecuador Chequea and 172 from Maldito Bulo published between February 1 and April 30, 2019, were collected, which includes the time before, during, and after the elections in Ecuador and Spain. In that period of time, both countries held elections to elect mayors, councilors, prefects, and members of parochial boards, in the case of Ecuador; and, deputies and senators in the case of Spain.

Based on the data recovered, a classification of rumors into seven categories is proposed in which the numerically greater contents are grouped and that are common between both countries: false statements attributed to candidates, campaign proposals of the candidates, the publication of false surveys, presentation of events that occurred in other countries as local, which were part of a previous study carried out by Magallón (2019), to which three others are added: migration, as it is a common theme between both countries, the announcement of electoral fraud and false electoral results.

In the same way, from the review of the Ecuador Chequea and Maldito Bulo projects, the content analysis of their methodologies is carried out in

order to identify common and innovative practices in the informative verification process: categories of verifications, selection of verifiable elements, verification process, and dissemination of the verified ones.

Analysis and discussion of results

Politics and migration are the topics about which the most rumors were spread, and therefore about which the greatest number of refutations were made (Figure 1). In the political context, for obvious reasons, the electoral process was the main element in the news and information disseminated in the media and social networks: the development of the campaign, declarations, speeches, confrontations, preparation of the elections, among others.

On the other hand, the migration issue, which occupies the second place, reflects that there is a marked interest in both countries due to the large presence of migrants of different nationalities, which is why it is an issue present in the electoral political discourse. There were also other types of topics related to surveys, campaign proposals, electoral fraud, false final results, in less quantity.

Figure 1
Thematic of the refuted posts

Source: Ecuador Chequea, n.d.-a; Damn Bulo, n.d.
Own elaboration.

In Ecuador Chequea of 45% of the posts framed in the political issue, there are publications related to false statements attributed to candidates, the

announcement of false electoral results, inconsistencies in campaign plans disseminated on social networks, financing of electoral campaigns, among others. 32% of the posts focus on migration issues that refer in a special way to Venezuelan citizens who in the last year have come to the country en masse as a result of the political crisis they are going through.

The results for Spain are not too different from the Ecuadorian case. 50% of the contents correspond to political issues especially related to the candidates and parties that participated in the April 2019 elections, wrongly printed ballots, the presumption of electoral fraud, false statements by candidates, creation of candidate parody accounts, student protests, and citizens in general, among others. The rumors and lies were mainly presented in the form of alleged statements with photos and videos manipulated and taken out of context that attributed to a candidate statements that were not said, or made in a different context.

34% allude to the immigration issue with articles such as the charge of 1200 euros per month by illegal immigrants, modification of the social security law, censorship of Podemos towards offensive processions for citizens, the slaughter of lambs by Muslims. From the total of publications framed in the political sphere, a classification of rumors was made, which can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2
Types of rumors spread during the elections

Source: Ecuador Chequea, n.d.-a; Damn Bulo, n.d.
Own elaboration.

The false statements were framed in the situation of each country. For example, in Ecuador, the candidate Jorge Yunda was attributed the following statement in a televised interview: "the real problem of the city is the bad temper, and we know how to combat it" (Ecuador Chequea, 2019), with which it was tried to position a not very serious image of who pretended to be the mayor of the country's capital.

Another case is the supposed tweet of Pablo Iglesias, candidate of Podemos saying "I hope for a bomb now in Colón. Where are the terrorists when they are needed?" in connection with a demonstration for the unity of Spain held in February 2019.

In both cases, the refutations were made by searching for the original statements: the video, in the case of Yunda, and the tweet in the case of Iglesias, neither existed.

Second, Ecuador Chequea, goes to the source, Yunda, to question about the statements and they were denied, in addition to this, the original video is published, to which the false statement is attributed and nothing similar to the false publication said is mentioned.

Figure 3
Other refuted issues

Source: Ecuador Chequea, n.d.-a; Damn Bulo, n.d.
Own elaboration.

Another recurring theme is related to the candidates' campaign proposal and the announcement of false election results. An example of the aforementioned can be seen in Figure 3, which includes two tweets: the first from Maldito Bulo about electoral fraud alerts in Spain, and the second, the supposed announcement of the candidate Gabriela Rivadeneira from List 5 as the positioning of this party as the main political force in Ecuador, both denied.

Regarding the level of interaction of users with the issues refuted by fact-checking accounts in Ecuador and Spain, there is a great difference between the two. The Ecuador Chequea account has a very low level of interaction from its users compared to Maldito Bulo, where a large number of retweets and favorites are observed in the publications. Ecuador Chequea obtains 10% of user interaction with its clarifications, while Maldito Bulo has at least 70% on average. In the same way, it was evident that the reactions to the refutations made by both organizations do not have the same virality as the rumors. Figure 4 shows the relationship of popularity between fake news and denials.

Figure 4
Popularity relationship between denials and rumors

Source: Ecuador Chequea, n.d.-a; Damn Bulo, n.d.
Own elaboration.

To expand the information in the previous image, Table 1 shows the five publications subjected to verification and that have the highest number of interactions in each country, there the difference between the two countries can be seen, in terms of interaction with verified information.

Table 1
Main rumors refuted in the electoral campaigns

@EcuadorChequea	Fav	RT	@MalditoBulo	Fav	RT
@MashiRafael says that the members of the Participation Council are being stolen. "Thief who robs a thief."	47	41	No. This video is not from today's demonstration in Colón. The Barclays building that collapsed last year appears. There is no Netflix advertising that is in Colón today.	5.6K	6.5K
@PaolaVintimilla is right. The data of the Municipality of Quito reflect, as of February 2019, a total of 19,253 employees. The figure includes officials from the municipal administration and municipal public companies...#NoComasCuento	29	18	No, there is no evidence that residents of Madrid have removed tapes against caterpillars thinking they were yellow ties	909	1.1K
The information is false. After monitoring the La Posta Ec interview, the phrase attributed to @LoroHomero... #NoComasCuento and check https://t.co/TPPdSrWD1Q https://t.co/8SNq16suXj	13	11	No. Pablo Iglesias has neither published nor deleted a tweet saying "hopefully a bomb now in Colón". It is a fake tweet, there is no proof of its publication. Only a capture (the same one) that is being viralized as real being false. https://twitter.com/malditobulo/status/1094900978485211136	726	973
Although the movement used by former President Correa to nominate his candidates achieved the prefectures of Pichincha and Manabí, list 5 did not reach any of the 49 mayoralties it sought... #NoComasCuento https://t.co/86H66sMk3Y https://t.co/wU2fukhxFa	7	8	No, the supposed poll of the Diario de Andorra that gives 82 seats to Vox does not exist: it is a montage.https://twitter.com/malditobulo/status/1122160203099721728	532	647

Source: Ecuador Chequea, n.d.-a; Damn Bulo, n.d.
Own elaboration.

The refutations about these five posts are developed through three main practices identified in both cases (Figure 5). The most common is the search for information in the media, mainly in the press; secondly, in the case of statements by a candidate, they search their social networks for evidence of what he/she supposedly said.

Finally, in both cases they go to official sources, to verify information on expenses, statistics, and other data, developing the journalistic exercise of informative contrast, as well as interviews with the sources involved in the rumor, which allows, in addition to verifying a rumor, to report based on information produced by the medium itself.

In some cases, it is even observed the use of expert sources that contribute to the explanation of a topic and thereby promote the understanding of a topic, in addition to clarifying a rumor.

The work of Ecuador Chequea in reviewing government plan documents and comparing them is highlighted, in this process, based on official information, infographics were made to inform the electorate, rather than to deny rumors.

Figure 5
Techniques to disprove fake news

Source: Ecuador Chequea, n.d.-a; Damn Bulo, n.d.
Own elaboration.

Regarding Maldito Bulo, it is explained that if the verification cannot be carried out through the aforementioned strategies, other alternatives are used that have to do with more specific levels of access to information.

> Sometimes, if even after due diligence the falseness of the message cannot be proven, but it is believed that additional information can be accessed using the transparency law, the additional information is requested to provide more insight on the complete fact. (Maldita.es, n.d.)

The denial or verification usually contains as much detail as possible, along with photographs and, in some cases, videos that help support the truth about the rumor that is being demolished. In addition to this, both initiatives make sure to label each rumor that has reached their hands with different categories, some of which resemble each other as shown below:

Table 2
Verification categories

Ecuador Chequea	Maldito Bulo
True	
Yes, but	True, but
Untenable	
False	False
	False, but

Source: Ecuador Chequea, n.d.-a; Damn Bulo, n.d.
Own elaboration.

In the case of Maldito Bulo, when a rumor submitted to verification is verified as true, it is not published on the social networks, therefore they do not include that category. However, as expressed in the Data Methodology of Maldito Bulo, 2019, this qualification can be used when it comes to a confrontation between two parties that requires clarification to the public.

Conclusions

The flow of vast amounts of information, from many issuers to many recipients, increases the need for qualified information providers dedicated to fact-checking. °

The task of verifying the facts carried out by Ecuador Chequea and Maldito Bulo allows us to measure the contribution of journalism, as that profession that has a social responsibility with the quality of the information and, in the same way, the role of the journalist, as the professional who develops the commitment to work with the information and the set of activities framed in the collection of data, verification, statements, documents, and others that allow him to develop the content that it transmits to the public through different media with quality and in a timely manner (Muratova et al., 2019).

In addition to this, the two fact-checking initiatives studied are made up of groups of journalists who are in charge of both content evaluation and information verification. Which calls to reconsider journalism, so worn out, as that profession that has the truth as its maximum obligation. Truth is not spoken of in a philosophical sense, but in a journalistic sense, which considers the exercise of fact-checking as one of its basic principles, and at the same time the practice that enables the creation of informational content based on facts.

Disinformation, and especially fake news, with its highly emotional content, permeates people more deeply than verified information, which is worrying, but at the same time, reflects the need to develop digital skills that allow the user to discriminate content online and use information critically.

It is no less true that the different misinformative phenomena also take advantage of the absence of data and information that help people to know a topic and do not allow them to easily believe a rumor that is trying to sneak in as truth. Of course, that also depends on the levels of informative exposure of the people and the topics to which they choose to expose themselves.

As expected, in an electoral context, the process itself constituted the main theme of the lies spread on the Internet, and despite the fact that 45% of refutations from Ecuador and 50% of denials from Spain are framed on this issue, Migration cannot be ignored as a sensitive issue in both countries, which is why it has a prevalence level greater than 30% in relation to others, such as survey results and suspicions of electoral fraud.

The verification of facts constitutes a key in order to guarantee the truth in the information that is disseminated, while avoiding that the media are

limited to becoming loudspeakers for political discourse, and instead identifying and clarifying inaccurate information before its diffusion. This suggests the value of verification and research, other studies could inquire about the extent to which journalists develop both in the current disinformation context.

The most evident contribution of this work is the vision of journalism in the function of guaranteeing the truth, in an environment where there are many senders addressing many recipients at the same time, and where it is necessary to discredit lying and strengthen verification as a discipline.

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