

Comparison of frames in social networks of the 2016 and 2021 elections in Peru: the case of candidates Fujimori and Mendoza

Comparación de frames en redes sociales de las elecciones de 2016 y 2021 en Perú: el caso de las candidatas Fujimori y Mendoza

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Abstract

This article compares the publications on social networks of the candidates Verónica Mendoza and Keiko Fujimori in the electoral processes of 2016 and 2021, the only candidates who participated in both processes. For this comparison, the framing theory was used, having as cutoff periods before and after the electoral debates. The publications in social networks were classified into thematic, strategic, and positional frames. The interest of the comparison lies in observing if the electoral debate, a privileged event to show proposals and government plans, envisions a change in the type of framing of the candidates. It is observed that the publications of the candidates envision different framing positions, but the debate does not change the tenor of the publications, favoring strategic frames over positional and thematic ones.

Keywords

Frame, positional, strategic, thematic, networks, Peruvian elections, Fujimori, Mendoza.

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Resumen

Este artículo compara las publicaciones en redes sociales de las candidatas Verónica Mendoza y Keiko Fujimori en los procesos electorales de 2016 y 2021, únicas candidatas que participaron en ambos procesos. Para esta comparación se utilizó la teoría del *framing*, teniendo como cortes periodos previos y posteriores a los debates electorales. Las publicaciones en redes sociales se clasificaron en *frames* temáticos, estratégicos y posicionales. El interés de la comparación radica en observar si el debate electoral, evento privilegiado para mostrar propuestas y planes de gobierno, avizora un cambio en el tipo de enmarcamiento de las candidatas. Se observa que las publicaciones de las candidatas muestran diferentes posiciones de enmarcamiento, pero el debate no cambia el tenor de las publicaciones, privilegiándose los *frames* estratégicos sobre los posicionales y temáticos.

Palabras clave

Frame, posicional, estratégico, temático, redes sociales, elecciones peruanas, Fujimori, Mendoza.

Introduction

Social media posts have allowed candidates to express different aspects related to their daily work, their positions on the political situation or about any issue. This form of communication usually happens during electoral and non-electoral periods.

However, there are several moments in electoral processes that have a special milestone, such as the registration of candidates, electoral debates, closing of the campaign, election day, etc. One of these expected events is the electoral debate, since it is a time where candidates have the opportunity to express their proposals or government plans, although it is not exempt from confrontations or jokes that may exist between participants. The media are also attentive to this event, and usually, in Peru, broadcast live with open signal.

While the electoral processes have taken place in the corresponding periods, the political and party landscape has been mixed. Peru has shown a political weakness, originally attributed to Alberto Fujimori's authoritarianism in the 2000s, but which has remained in the continuum of electoral processes (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003; Zavaleta, 2014). The political landscape has

also characterized by the presence of local conflicts, mainly related to socio-environmental issues, but with little national presence or call that can articulate social movements (Vergara and Encinas, 2015; Meléndez and León, 2010).

Apparently, there is some continuity and control in the economic management, as observed, precisely due to the political weakness, where control was maintained by the Executive with the support of business groups (Dargent and Rousseau, 2021); however, there is a possible gap in this control due to the confrontation between the Executive and Congress during the period of the election after 2016, where according to Dargent and Rousseau (2021), censorship, questioning and presidential vacancies have caused the Executive to lose control over the economic and political, which is seen by the little influence of the Ministries of Economy and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

In this scenario, marked by certain continuities and changes, only two candidates participated in both electoral processes, Keiko Fujimori and Verónica Mendoza, and both from different political ideas.

This study compares the types of posts made by both candidates on social networks, both on Facebook and Twitter, during the electoral processes of 2016 and 2021, comparing the electoral debates. The hypothesis guiding this research states that the debate does not generate any change in the type of framing of the publications of the candidates. To perform this analysis, the publications have been captured and categorized into three types of frames: positional, strategic and thematic. Also, to see if the debate generates a change, the same number of days before and after this event is compared in both electoral processes.

The main conclusions show few changes in the type of framing of the candidates studied, therefore, the debate does not generate significant changes. The strategic frames have a higher prevalence in the publications of the candidates, above the thematic and positional ones; and significant differences are found only in the electoral process of 2016 and not in the 2021.

Electoral Process 2016 and 2021

Ten candidates from different political parties and groups participated in the 2016 Peruvian electoral process. The general elections were held on April 11, 2016, with candidates Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and Keiko Fujimori gaining the main votes of the electorate. However, since neither of them

obtained 50% plus one of the valid votes,¹ as established by Peruvian electoral law, there was a second electoral round, where candidate Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was the winner, by a margin of 0.12% of the valid votes (ONPE, 2016). Both candidates were visualized as candidates from the right party, with some differences, although both candidates preferred little intervention of the state in the economy, Keiko Fujimori was envisioned as part of a populist party of conservative right (Sulmont, 2017; Meléndez, 2012); instead, Kuczynski was envisioned as center-right, with emphasis on private investment and a technocratic management of the State (Sulmont, 2017). However, the other big difference was that Keiko Fujimori represents a continuism of the form of government of her father, Alberto Fujimori,² with the presence of a strong hand and authoritarianism (Sulmont, 2017).

Eighteen candidates participated in the 2021 electoral process. This increase in candidacies was due to the electoral law establishing that a political party that did not obtain more than 5 per cent of valid votes, or at least five representatives to Congress in two separate electoral constituencies, would lose registration. This also included parties that did not present themselves to the electoral process, or resigned during the same process, a situation that in the 2016 electoral process it was non-binding to lose the electoral registration.

In these electoral processes, there has been a variety of political parties, which could reflect greater political participation; however, there is a weak institutionality of political parties, where mechanisms of internal democracy and control are limited (Tanaka, 2005), generating little trust in the parties by the citizenry and electoral volatility (Meléndez, 2019), being increasingly common the appearance of personalist parties (Zavaleta, 2014, Sulmont, 2017).

Although the period between the two electoral processes took place over five years, as established by the presidential term, the political environment in Peru was “convulsed” as unusual political events took place. Since Kuczynski took power, the Congress, with a majority of the Fujimori party, marked a confrontation with the Executive, going so far as to censor ministers, to summon ministers for questioning, which for Dargent and Rousseau (2021) manifests a breaking point in the control of the Executive over the Legislative.

This confrontation aggravated because Kuczynski could not explain the consultancies made to the construction company Odebrecht, when he was minister

1 Voting is compulsory in Peru for people from 18 to 70.

2 Alberto Fujimori is convicted of corruption and crimes against humanity.

of economy in the government of Toledo (2001-2006), which led to Congress proposing a presidential vacancy. For all this, the government granted a pardon to Alberto Fujimori, even though it was not part of its task, negotiating, for this, the rejection of the vacancy in exchange for promises of works to certain congressmen; and when the press uncovered these conspiracies in March 2018, Kuczynski resigned the presidency, assuming his vice president Martin Vizcarra. But the situation of confrontation did not change, instead, Vizcarra dissolved the Congress for the second denial of trust to the prime minister, and called new congressional elections for January 2020, however, this new Congress censored it by a possible act of corruption when he was governor of Moquegua department.³

According to the transfer of power, Manuel Merino had to take over as president, who held the position of president of the Congress, but he only lasted less than a week, due to citizen protests and, after the death of two students and hundreds of injured in a demonstration, he was forced to resign. So Congress elected another board of directors, where the president Francisco Sagasti assumed the interim presidency of the Executive in November 2020, who upon taking office established the schedule of general elections, both for the presidency and for the parliament; coinciding with all these events in the period that Kuczynski should remain in power.

In this scenario, the general elections were scheduled for April 11, 2021, where the electoral preferences were obtained by candidate Pedro Castillo and candidate Keiko Fujimori, but not obtaining any more than 50% of valid votes plus one⁴ had to go to a second electoral round, where candidate Pedro Castillo was the winner, with a margin of 0.126% of valid votes (ONPE, 2021). Between these two candidates there were different positions in the economic part, but very similar positions in the social aspect and even considered conservative (Meléndez in Paúl, 2021; Zavaleta in Luna *et al.*, 2021).

As seen in both electoral processes, candidate Keiko Fujimori obtained the first electoral preferences (in 2016 she obtained 39.86% of valid votes and in 2021 she obtained 13.4% of valid votes), which led to a second round of voting, but in both electoral processes she lost in these ballots. Candidate Verónica Mendoza also participated in both electoral processes, having di-

3 These facts gathered by the Office of the Prosecutor are still under investigation and no formal complaint has been filed.

4 It is worth mentioning that neither candidate received more than 20 per cent of valid votes, which also shows some volatility of the vote in those elections.

fferent results. In 2016 she obtained 18.7% of valid votes (the third with the highest vote), while in 2021 she only obtained 7.8%. Although both candidates obtained greater intention to vote in the 2016 process, they were the only candidates who ran for both electoral processes.

It is also necessary to state that Keiko Fujimori has run three times for president of the Republic, in 2011, 2016 and 2021. She has run for the party Popular Force in the last two elections, a party located on the right ideals that manifests an economic policy of free market, but with social conservative tones. On the other hand, Verónica Mendoza belongs to the political party Together for Peru, located in the political ideals of socialist and environmentalist left (Sulmont, 2017), which aims to increase the state's participation in the economy, raise taxes on profits and reconstitute certain social rights to the population.

Framing

Although frame theory can have different meanings without a core body (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999), because there are different definitions, it has gradually expanded to various fields or objects of study, and has been focusing its field of study. For Goffman (1986), frames are the organizational principles that govern events, and it is possible to make structural interpretations of social reality. On the other hand, for Gamson and Modigliani (1989), frames provide us with a set of interpretive ideas that give meaning to a topic, having at its core a framework that gives meaning to events.

Following Entman (1993), frames allow to select some aspects of the perceived reality and highlight them in a communicative text, in such a way that it allows to define a problem, interpret it and evaluate it. These definitions explain that from a set of tools is plausible the interpretation and evaluation of the social reality and what is transmitted in it, causing a communicative text in something more readable that can be transmitted. From this conceptualization, the discourse of the media (media frames) was analyzed. According to Chong and Druckman (2007), the media frames consist of that whole set of words, images, phrases that the speaker uses when transmitting information about an event to the audience. For D'Angelo (2018) studies on the media frames are the most common.

According to D'Angelo (2018), the studies of frames for analyzing electoral processes have concentrated in studies of generic frames, applied to di-

fferent topics and political processes; and the studies of specific frames have been used to investigate an interpretation of the news facts. Studies have tried to develop different classifications (Newman *et al.*, 1992; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Vliegenthart *et al.*, 2008, Yyengar, 1991) in order to account for the way in which certain information is transmitted to the population or audience.

Strategic, positional and thematic frameworks

In the studies of generic frames, the electoral process is the one that has brought some recurrence, and within this, the period of the electoral campaign. The way the media approached the campaign has been a field studied from several approaches. However, many studies showed certain framing, which began to be called strategic game. This form of framing attempts to highlight how the media approaches the electoral process, for example, what was prioritized in the campaign, such as the qualities of the candidates, their phrases, campaign strategy, the jokes among the candidates. These studies showed some prioritization by the electoral news for strategic play, more so for the so-called horse race (Iyengar *et al.*, 2004; Kahn, 1991; Patterson, 1994; Russonello and Wolf, 1979; Sigelman and Bullock, 1991); these studies showed the advantage that a candidate could have. Jamieson (1992) contributed by pointing out that this news coverage scheme used the language of war and sport. In addition, De Vreese and Semetko (2002) included aspects related to the qualities or personal performance of the candidates.

This way of observing the different ways in which the media made framing was called strategic by some authors (Capella and Jamieson, 1997; D'Angelo *et al.*, 2005; De Vreese, 2005; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002; Jamieson, 1992); other authors called it frame of play (Lawrence, 2000; Patterson, 1994; Pedersen, 2012; Shehata, 2013; Strömbo) and Aalberg, 2008) and other studies defined it as a strategic game frame (Muñiz, 2015; Rinke *et al.*, 2013; Schmuck *et al.*, 2016). However, these groupings used to share the same indicators (Muñiz 2015, De Vreese 2005, Dimitrova and Kostadinova, 2013). Aalberg *et al.* (2012) state that the strategic game frame contains two dimensions that refer to two types of frames. Therefore, the strategic frame focuses on the strategies, tactics or motivations of the campaign, candidates or political parties. Instead, the game frame focuses on presenting the electoral process as a competition, war, where there are winners and losers (Aal-

berg *et al.*, 2012). Following Aalberg *et al.* (2012) the game frame name is changed to positional. Therefore, there are two types of frames that started as group, but it is more convenient to separate them for a better reading, in one the strategic is highlighted, and in another the positional (which includes the idea of the advantages, the position).

Although there has been some discussion about strategic and game frames, this has not been so much because of the thematic frame, which encompasses the way in which the news or publication highlights proposals, government plans or explanations about them (Macassi and Cohaila, 2022), where the objective of the publication is to show the reference to the approach of what would be done if the electoral preference comes to be obtained.

Methodological design

The intention of the study is to compare the posts of both candidates on social networks; for this purpose, the framing theory will be used as a tool. In this comparison, the electoral debate in both electoral processes will be used as courts. From there, the research questions posed are:

Q1: Do positional, strategic and thematic frames have the same prevalence during the 2016 and 2021 election processes?

Q2: Do positional, strategic and thematic frames behave differently, depending on the type of social network used by candidates Keiko Fujimori and Verónica Mendoza, in the 2016 and 2021 processes?

The hypotheses are:

H1: The type of frame in both electoral processes has not undergone any change, maintaining strategic and positional frames on the topics, the debate not producing any change.

H2: The types of frames in both electoral processes have not undergone any change, therefore, the behavior is similar in the frames used by both candidates, both on Facebook and on Twitter.

Variables and indicators

For this study, positional, strategic and thematic frames are analyzed. Therefore, it is necessary to manifest this operationalization process. This construction is due to the treatment carried out by Macassi and Cohaila (2022),

where the differences between these three types of frames are established, but has been adapted to the posts of the candidates on social networks.

As for the positional frame, it is understood in this case that the candidate prioritizes some progress or regression in the publication in the position expressed in the public opinion and that is collected by it, therefore, it will be observed if:

- The social media post focuses on survey data, interviews (expression).
- The social media post focuses on the positive or negative outcomes her candidacy would have (prediction).
- The social media post alludes to proposals, but with emphasis on whether they grow, decrease or gain public acceptance (progress).
- The social media post uses a language of competition, associated with sport, running, games or even war (competition).
- The social media post alludes that the candidate's actions improve her position (advantage).

As for the strategic frame, it is understood that the candidate prioritizes in the publication aspects related to the political campaign, strategies, attributes or resources, therefore, it will be observed if:

- The social media post focuses on the actions and/or activities of the political campaign implemented by the candidate (tactics and strategies).
- Posts focus on the reasons or motivations of the candidate or her team to carry out activities during the campaign (motivation attribution).
- Posts focus on the advantages or disadvantages of the candidate's style, performance, or attributes (personalization).
- Posts focus on resources, support or media coverage of the candidate (competitive resources).

The thematic frame alludes to the way in which the candidate prioritizes contents related to proposals, problems, government plans or demands. Therefore, it will be observed if:

- Posts allude to institutional reforms, public policies, policy changes, bills (transformation).
- Social media post focus on issues, whether general or sectoral, and even sub-national (problematic).

- The social media post alludes to government plans, programs, (programmatic) ideology.
- Posting on social networks refers to possible solutions in short time frames or administrative measures (solutions).
- The social media publication focuses on the needs, requests or complaints of the population (demands).

The process of coding the candidates' posts on social networks was carried out in a double-coding process. In this process, where there was no match,⁵ we proceeded to review the publication to establish the type of frame it corresponded to. It was also noted that the candidates' publications may express or refer to more than one type of frame, so no particular one was prioritized, but all the information was collected, which led to considering more than one type of frame in certain publications.

Since the study tries to compare two moments in relation to the debate. The cut-off for comparison will be the date of the debate, and the same number of days before and after the debate will be used for both processes. The electoral debate did not take place during the same period in both processes, since it used to take place the Sunday before the elections, as happened in the electoral processes of 2006, 2011 and 2016. However, there were changes in the last electoral process of 2021, mainly due to the number of candidates running, so the National Jury of Elections established the holding of this event in three days. So, the electoral debate in the 2016 elections took place on Sunday, April 3, a week before the elections, but the debate of the 2021 process took place from Monday, March 29 to Wednesday, March 31, just two weeks before the elections. In the draw of dates, the candidates Keiko Fujimori and Verónica Mendoza were set the first day of the debate, a situation that also facilitates this comparison process in the study.

Six days before and six days after the debate were used as a reference for obtaining the posts on social networks, both on Facebook and Twitter. This comparison line helps to have the same field for both processes. While the six-day period may be short, it is because the seventh day in the 2016 election process was election day. To better illustrate the pickup times, the following table is presented.

5 The non-matching process amounted to less than 10 per cent of the total publications.

Table 1
Post Analysis Process

Process 2016				Process 2021			
Pre-debate	Discussion	Post-debate	Voting	Pre-debate	Discussion	Post-debate	Voting
March 28 to April 2	April 03	04-09 April	April 10	March 23-28	March 29	March 30 to April 4	April 11

Results

The total number of posts analyzed amounts to 207 on both social networks, being slightly higher in the 2016 election period (108 posts) compared to the 2021 election period (99 posts). The number of posts per day is not enough. If breaking down this amount, it is observed that female candidates usually publish less than three posts in each period analyzed (on average 2.26 posts per day per social network for 2016; and 2.06 posts per day per social network for the period of 2021). Consequently, the behavior is similar in the number of posts in both periods for both candidates. Cohaila (2019) also warned the little use of social networks by candidates.

Overall, considering both periods studied, the largest number of publications is within the strategic frame (53.6%), followed by the thematic (31.9%), and the least used is positional (14.5%). This distribution also follows the same trend on each electoral period analyzed, since the strategic frame is the one that has the greatest use by the publications of the candidates analyzed, followed by the thematic, and being the least used the positional frame. However, the difference lies in the proportion in each period. It is observed a significant difference in proportions between the period 2016 and 2021, but only in the positional frame. Therefore, although the behavior in the use of frames follows the same logic, there has been a decrease in the use of positional frames from 2016 to 2021, but this decrease does not mean that strategic or thematic have any significant variation.

As observed, the use of strategic frames is favored, indicating that candidates prefer to express the support, but above all their activities and campaign strategies.

Table 2

Type of frames used in the 2016 and 2021 electoral periods

		Year		Total
		2016	2021	
Frame	Strategic	49.1%	58.6%	53.6%
	Positional	21.3%*	7.1%*	14.5%
	Thematic	29.6%	34.3%	31.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Amount		108	99	207

*The difference in proportions manifests a p.value <0.05

Analyzing the period before and after the debate, differences are observed, but only in the period of 2016, where the debate configured a change in the type of publications, as it sought to decrease the strategic frame and increased the thematic as a strategy in the publications of the candidates. However, in the period of 2021 the debate did not configure any change, rather the behavior of the publications follows the same course, prioritizing the strategic frames, followed by the thematic frames and to a lesser extent the positional frames; although there is a decrease of the thematic frames, these are not significant. This change brought about by the debate could be due to the fact that the candidates had to focus on the proposals in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of the participants, therefore, the need to mention more proposals in their publications.

Table 3

Frame type according to electoral debate

		Court debate			
		Pre-debate 2016	Post-debate 2016	Pre-debate 2021	Post-debate 2021
Frame	strategic	66.7%*	39.1%*	57.4%	59.6%
	positional	28.2%	17.4%	4.3%	9.6%
	thematic	5.1%*	43.5%*	38.3%	30.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Proportions test, p.value <0.05

However, it remains to be seen whether this change in frames occurs equally in both candidates or in any particular one. According to the candidate and the process of electoral debate, changes are only observed in the period of 2016, where the debate configures a change in the type of frame, but only in the candidate Verónica Mendoza, where a significant difference is observed, having the debate an effect on the increase of thematic frames to the detriment of strategic ones; although, in the candidate Keiko Fujimori this configuration is also observed, decrease of strategic frames and increase of thematic ones, these do not manage to establish a significant difference. This change in candidate Verónica Mendoza could be due to the need to highlight her proposals, but above all the justification, to attract the electorate by explaining this new social and political pact (Fowks, 2016). In this election she almost made it to the second round, with the difference with Kuczynski being around two percentage points.

In the period of 2021, although there are changes in the number of frame types in both candidates, it is not significant, therefore, there is the same behavior before and after the electoral debate, predominantly strategic, followed by thematic, and in much less presence positional frames.

Table 4

Type of frames according to candidate and electoral period

			Debate Court			
			Pre-debate 2016	Post-debate 2016	Pre-debate 2021	Post-debate 2021
Keiko Fujimori	Frame	Strategic	50.0%	40.0%	73.3%	60.0%
		Positional			6.7%	
		Thematic	50.0%	60.0%	20.0 %	40.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Verónica Mendoza	Frame	Strategic	67.6%*	39.0%*	50.0%	59.6%
		Positional	29.7%	20.3%	3.1%	10.6%
		Thematic	2.7%*	40.7%*	46.9%	29.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

*Proportional difference, p.value <0.05.

As stated, the change in the frame type only indicates a different behavior in the 2016 process, which is observed only in Verónica Mendoza. However, it remains to be seen whether or not this change is observed in both social networks. It can be seen that the change only occurs on Facebook, where the strategic frame is reduced and the thematic one is increased, having the publications on Twitter the same behavior for both candidates, being first the strategic frames, and then the thematic and positional ones.

Table 5

Type of frames used by candidate and social network in the 2016 and 2021 electoral periods

Candidate			Debate				Total	
			Pre-debate 2016	Post-debate 2016	Pre-debate 2021	Post-debate 2021		
Keiko Fujimori	Facebook	Frame	Strategic	100.0%	40.0%	75.0%	66.7%	64.7%
			Positional			12.5%		5.9%
		Thematic		60.0%	12.5%	33.3%	29.4%	
	Total			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Twitter	Frame	Strategic		40.0%	71.4%	50.0%	53.3%
			Thematic	100.0%	60.0%	28.6%	50.0%	46.7%
Total			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Verónica Mendoza	Facebook	Frame	Strategic	78.6%*	35.4%*	46.2%	65.5%	54.2%
			Positional	21.4%	14.6%	7.7%	10.3%	14.4%
		Thematic		50.0%*	46.2%	24.1%	31.4%	
	Total			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Twitter	Frame	Strategic	33.3%	54.5%	52.6%	50.0%	49.1%
			Positional	55.6%	45.5%		11.1%	21.1%
Thematic		11.1%		47.4%	38.9%	29.8%		
Total			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

*Proportional difference, p.value <0.05

As observed, the debate does not generate a significant change in the social media posts of the candidates analyzed. Rather, to some extent, there is the same pattern with minimal changes, but not significant; this is similar to what Cohaila (2020) mentioned when analyzing the posts of candidates in the 2016 elections in Peru, and remarked that the debate did not seek much change in the posts of candidates, having the candidates a same pattern in their posts on social networks.

This pattern observed shows more use of strategic frames to convey the strategy, tactics, support to the campaign and how a personalization is generated. In the same sense, Montúfar-Calle *et al.* (2022), show a high personalization level in the political campaign on social networks of the candidates in the first round of elections, which seems to be repeated for these two candidates, but now, for both electoral periods. This use of personalization also manifests political fragility, where the main figure is the candidate, reinforcing the idea of personalist parties (Meléndez, 2019; Zavaleta, 2014).

As this is the last week of the campaign, where the intention is to capture undecided votes, the candidates develop a campaign to do so. According to Tuesta (in Andina, 2021), these days are key to attracting undecided votes and fragile votes; therefore, the campaign usually targets this goal, trying to differentiate itself from the other candidates, so one would expect to see this in the publications, but it was not observed instead the strategic frame was seen before and after the debate, which could be explained because the candidates close the campaign, and use their networks for proselytizing activities and establish their strategies of calling, highlighting this personalization. On the other hand, a big call can also help to improve the drive or sympathy of the candidates and help in the citizen support.

Although, in this last stage of the campaign, post-debate focuses on transmitting a certain strategy (how I am doing, what I am doing, where I have come, receiving shows of support or affection), the type of communication is unidirectional. It manifests something, trying to invite the public, but not trying to get them involved, this has been common in the posts of the candidates, although it could be stated that it is a recurring thing in all candidates (Cohaila, 2020); being an exception the use of networks by candidate Garcia in the 2016 process, when he tried through online games to involve young people. This type of unidirectional communication is not alien in other countries, in Mexico, Gonzales (2013) observes little use of social networks to generate involvement, and Hernández (2013) in El Salvador observes a direction towards the vote of

young people, but with little interaction with them; likewise, D'Andamo *et al.* (2015) analyzing the process in Argentina, say that the interactive potential of social networks is not capitalized. This situation is also observed by Cárdenas (2020) who analyzing the use of Twitter in Mexico, Colombia and Peru, finds little interaction of the candidates with their possible voters.

This unidirectional use can cause little involvement in voters, however, there are studies that also highlight some contribution in electoral campaigns or mobilization. In Peru, it is very common for candidates to place themselves above those who make it to the second round of elections, so their online posts can generate this mobilization, either in support of or against any candidate. This is also closely linked to the strategy of the electoral campaign and the use of social networks there. In this regard, Hernández (2013) notes that social networks are used to spread messages, generate visibility, but are not used to generate or build a community around the candidacy. Likewise, Cohaila (2019) also noted the limited use of social networks for the campaign and its mobilization, being Twitter more use than Facebook. Similarly, Mementi *et al.* (2011) observed the low importance in the campaign to a communication strategy of the actors through social networks. A particular case can be observed in Kuczynski's 2011 campaign, where for Aguilar and Aguilar (2014), it was possible to link and mobilize young people from middle and upper middle strata in an electoral marketing strategy.

However, correlating the publications made by the media, and having pre and post-debate cuts, Macassi and Cohaila (2022) find that the publications of the media on Twitter for the period of 2016 also show a behavior where the strategic prevails, and that this type of framing along with the positional does not suffer variation, while the subject has a greater significant presence after the debate, having this social network higher prevalence for these types of frames than Facebook. For Macassi and Cohaila (2022), there is some correlation in the media and on social networks about the publications. Although it is early to say, it could be stated that the media collects the publications of the candidates, and this trend is repeated in the media as it marks a more strategic position.

On the other hand, although different forms of grouping of the frames were used, in strategic game, thematic and events, Cohaila (2019) states that the frames used by the media (press, radio and television) in their social platforms do not make any difference, having the same prevalence in both periods, before and after the debate; being the strategic game the predominant one well above the thematic and the event.

This situation is not alien to Peru, Valera *et al.* (2022), when analyzing the electoral campaign in Spain, report that the press uses more strategic frameworks on the topics, including an allegorical language about war and sport. These authors also report that the same happened in the Spanish press during the electoral campaigns.

Hence, both candidates and the media tend to use strategic frames in their publications on social networks, and the electoral debate does not have significant differences on the type of framing.

Conclusions

The type of social media posts used by candidates Keiko Fujimori and Verónica Mendoza have a general pattern throughout the analysis process: the strategic frame, followed by the thematic and, finally, the positional. This behavior is similar for both 2016 and 2021 periods.

When comparing the type of frame according to electoral periods, a change in the type of publications is observed, but only in the 2016 process, where the debate leads to a significant change in the type of frame, having the strategic frame a decrease, which causes the thematic frame to increase. In 2021, the debate does not lead to a change, prioritizing the candidates strategic, followed by the thematic and finally the positional frame.

This type of change observed in the 2016 process is only seen in candidate Verónica Mendoza, and not in candidate Keiko Fujimori, therefore, it is this candidate that enables this change in her publications, varying the period of 2016 in its entirety.

This change propitiated in 2016 is only seen on Facebook and not on Twitter; therefore, the publications of candidate Verónica Mendoza had a change on Facebook where strategic frames had a decrease, favoring the increase of thematic frames.

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